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Abstract
In post-Yugoslav countries, national identity seems to be increasingly defined by the 
formulation of a traditional discourse on sexuality and gender, culminating in a grow-
ing interference of religious institutions with national debates and policies on LGBT-
rights. In this paper we aim to gain more insight into the discursive effects of such 
sexual nationalist discourse by exploring responses of the Serbian Orthodox Church to 
the 2014 Belgrade Pride parade. Drawing from theories on religious and sexual nation-
alism and queer geography, we will argue that while the Serbian Orthodox discourse 
on homosexuality is becoming more secular, this secularization of public speech is 
compensated by a strategy of reclaiming the streets of Belgrade through politically 
charged public religious ritual. As the church is in this way making its anti-LGBT atti-
tude physical and visible, Serbian citizens are increasingly requested to agree to 
Church teachings on sexuality and gender as a prerequisite for religious participation, 
resulting in an increasing divide between those “within” and “without” the community 
of Orthodox Serbs.
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1 Introduction
This article examines whether and how the oppositional pairing of religion and 
sexual diversity is contested in public space in Serbia. These ‘cultural opposi-
tional pairings and negotiations’ can be traced well through the responses to 
civil rights activists’ efforts to organize Gay Pride Parades since 2001. Several 
parades in Serbia were interrupted by violent attacks by ultranationalist groups 
and football hooligans (e.g. Belgrade Pride in 2001 is now remembered as the 
‘massacre pride’) or forbidden for fear of violence. Meanwhile, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church’s strong media opposition towards homosexuality indirectly 
provided legitimization for these violent responses (Jovanović 2011; Sremac 
et al., 2015). Members of ultranationalist groups have made far-reaching claims 
about the nature of Serbian identity, moral order and the ‘true’ Serbian nation, 
and called for tumbling of the current government and a clear anti-EU stance 
(Pavasović Trošt & Kovačević 2013). Serbian nationalist discourses represent 
homosexuality as a considerable Western threat to the traditional values of 
national and religious identity. Anti-Westernism is propagated and topics like 
sexual emancipation are viewed as “imposed by the decadent West” (Tucić 
2011, 45). Radical nationalist groups repudiate the European Union for having 
“dubious and ludicrous moral standards” and being “a true danger to tradition” 
(Spencer-Dohner 2008). The adoption of sexual minority policies is framed as 
the “international gay lobby’s” attack on national identity (Slootmaeckers & 
Touquet 2013). Similar discursive framing of homosexuality as a Western con-
spiracy may be observed in Russia and other Central and Eastern European 
countries. Understanding the construction of religion and homosexuality in 
Serbia therefore needs to be understood against the backdrop of social and 
political confusion, nationalism, anti-Western sentiment and rhetoric. The 
theoretical framework of our study lies in the focus on the intersection of three 
conflicting dimensions of constantly evolving identities: religion, sexuality, and 
nationalism. These identities are played out in relation to each other. Conflicts 
about religion and homosexuality thus not only show shifts and tensions in 
changing public perceptions of homosexuality, but also of religion and of 
national identity. It is only very recently that scholars are trying to gain a  better 
understanding of the issue (cf. Jovanović, 2013; Sremac & Ganzevoort, 2015). 
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2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework: Religio-Sexual 
Nationalism
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Our article brings together a number of theoretical contexts related to the 
study of religion, politics, and sexuality. In the academic literature the concep-
tual frame of sexual nationalism (or homonationalism1) is often understood 
in terms of the integration of homosexuality (or what has been called ‘sexual 
citizenship’) into the Western nation-state building, thus promoting progres-
sive rhetoric and politics on sexuality as well as ‘pro-gay’ discourse as part of 
the national and cultural identity configuration (Ahmed 2006; Dickinson 1999; 
Dudink 2011; El-Tayeb 2011; Geyer & Lehmann 2004; Hayes 2000; Kuntsman and 
Esperanza 2008; Mosse 1985; Kulpa 2013; Puar 2007; Parker et al. 1992; Sabsay 
2012; Stychin 1997; Walker 1996). We, however, use the term sexual national-
ism in a broader sense to include every perspective that links nationalism 
with sexuality. Both in ‘pro-gay’ rhetoric of Western sexual citizenship and in 
‘anti-gay’ discursive practices in Serbia, the role of the state is invoked to regu-
late sexuality through restrictive politics (pro or anti-gay discursive regimes) 
in the process of justifying national self-determination. Similarly, religious 
nationalism refers to nationalist discourses and practices that use and regu-
late specific views on and practices of religion (Aburaiya 2009; Abazović 2010; 
Arjomand 1994; Barker 2009; Brubaker 2012; Fukase-Indergaard & Indergaard 
2008; Grigoriadis 2013; Geyer & Lehmann 2004; Leustean 2008; Juergensmeyer 
2006, 2008; Smith 2003; Friedland 2002; 2011). Sremac and Ganzevoort (2015) 
argue that religio-sexual nationalisms are organized around erotic discourse, 
heteronormativity, patriarchal (often militarized) masculinity, heterosexual 
hegemony and the gendered order of society. Religio-sexual nationalisms, 
therefore, produce gender norms that are instrumental in political legitima-
tion strategies and played out in the public space. 
In this article we focus on the interplay between religious and sexual nation-
alism in public space, in particular the contested space of the city centre of 
Belgrade during the Gay Pride in 2014. In Belgrade, each year that the Pride 
Parade is announced the question immediately rises whether it will in fact 
happen or whether it will be cancelled. The local government may, even until 
the day before the parade, decide to call it off. In the weeks leading up to the 
parade, newspapers are filled with discussions on whether or not it should 
1   For Puar (2013, 337) the conceptual framework of homonationalism is “a facet of modernity 
and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of 
protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship 
between the state, capitalism, and sexuality.” 
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be allowed. The struggle over what may or may not happen on the streets of 
Belgrade on the day of the parade is, we argue, symbolic for an ongoing struggle 
that marks these streets for the remaining 364 days of the year. Insights from 
queer geography help us understand the particular role of space in the struggle 
over sexual citizenship. As geography took to heart one of post-structuralism’s 
most basic insights, namely that gendered and sexualized identities are not a 
given reality but rather a construct that comes into being through the repeti-
tion of cultural norms (Hubbard 2001, Skeggs et al. 2004, Bell and Valentine 
1995, see also Butler 1990, 1993), it has over the past decades changed its per-
spective on space. Like human subjects, spaces may appear to us “natural” and 
self-evident, while this perception is in fact the result of many discursive and 
aesthetic investments. Queer geography has shown on many occasions that 
these investments have often been gendered, sexualized and heteronormative 
(Elder 1998; Brown & Knopp 2003). Within this body of work, often focused 
on urban spaces, it has been made clear that city-spaces are sexually marked 
in a variety of ways, for instance through “gay neighborhoods”, “homophobic 
areas”, red light districts or gay cruising areas. In this marking of the public 
space, public events like Gay Prides form a particular case. As Gill Valentine 
(2003) has pointed out, Prides are often perceived as a “collective coming out”. 
During Pride events, LGBT people become visible not as individuals but as a 
community that not only claims citizenship rights, but also claims to leave its 
own mark on the public space, questioning its self-evident yet often violently 
enforced heterosexuality (Weeks 1998). Careful analyses in queer geography 
have further provided insights into these claims and shown that they are to 
be understood in a wider context of class, gender, ethnicity and regionality 
(Longhurst 2008). Gay neighborhoods may be a western phenomenon and 
moreover available only to those who can afford to live in them (Rushbrook 
2002), queer events or organisations may re-enforce gendered norms (Nash & 
Baine 2007), and moreover be de-politicized and claimed as a hallmark for the 
cosmopolitan stance of the city in question (Bell & Binnie 2004; Stella 2013). 
We suggest that religio-sexual and nationalist discourses on homosexual-
ity need to be understood in the context of this complex ideological struggle 
over the perception of the city, in this case Belgrade. Moreover, in this article 
we would like to show how the linguistic/discursive and the physical/spatial 
dimension of religious and sexual nationalism are inextricably intertwined. 
Imbuing spaces with meaning is both a matter of public speech and of the 
presence (or absence) of bodies, symbols, buildings and rituals. 
2.2 Corpora
The first part of our case study consists of an analysis of public discourse on 
the Pride Parade of 2014. Defining what exactly the ‘public discourse’ of the 
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Serbian Orthodox Church is in relation to LGBT issues and the Pride Parades 
is complicated. According to Serbian Orthodox doctrine only the Synod as a 
whole can issue public statements which represent the Church. If we were to 
follow this claim, there has only ever been one single statement of the Church 
with regard to LGBT issues, in which homosexuality as well as homophobic 
violence are condemned (Irinej Bački 2010). The public perception of the 
Church’s opinion, however, differs greatly from this official position and has 
been formed by the many other statements issued over the years by its individ-
ual representatives — which the Church has never refuted. For the purposes of 
this article, the public discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church is understood 
to be observable in: 1. different media under the direct control of the Church’s 
institutional hierarchy and 2. statements by official Church dignitaries, as 
mediated by the mainstream media. Our qualitative analysis of the public dis-
course of the Church with regard to LGBT issues and the Pride Parade in 2014 
will therefore encompass the following corpora: 
1. A selection of Church-controlled print media (Pravoslavlje, Svetigora, 
Glasnik, Pravoslavni misionar, Svetosavsko zvonce)2 for the period encom-
passing two weeks prior to the Pride Parade and 2 weeks following it; and 
a selection of other texts produced by the Church for specific potentially 
significant dates (in chronological order: the Christmas Encyclical 2013, 
Sabornik 3 for September 28, The Easter Encyclical 2014, Patriarch Irinej’s 
statement before the Pride Parade, and the Christmas Encyclical 2015).
2. A selection of mainstream daily print media (Blic, Danas, Informer, Kurir, 
Politika)4 for the period encompassing two weeks prior to the Pride 
Parade and 2 weeks following it since the debate is at its peak, most cov-
ered in the media and all the actors come together and interact with each 
other; and a selection of other texts appearing in the daily print and elec-
tronic media for specific dates which occasion it (namely, statements by 
Patriarch Irinej and Metropolitan Amfilohije reported by Blic in May 
2014). Furthermore, the analysis will focus on the discourses that 
 characterize the most representative debates on religious and sexual 
nationalism.
As will become clear below, official Church media — with the notable excep-
tion of the Patriarch’s statement — mostly practiced the politics of silence 
2   Orthodoxy, Holy Mount, The Tribune, The Orthodox Missionary, The Bell of St. Sava.
3   The Cathedral Bulletin.
4   Flash, Today, Informer, Courier, Politics.
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with regard to the issues of the Pride Parade in 2014. This is in contrast with, for 
example, the year 2009, when Pravoslavlje had a series of texts on the topic of 
homosexuality. Mainstream dailies provide more material for analysis of this 
year’s discourse and will therefore be cited here more extensively, along with 
articles from previous years which help provide historical context.
In the next section we will first discuss the attitude of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church towards homosexuality in the recent history prior to the year 2014. This 
brief overview will help us detect recent changes in discourse and strategy on 
the part of the church. We will then move to our case study of the 2014 Pride 
Parade, which consists of two parts. In the first part we discuss the debate on 
the Pride at the level of public discourse. The second part focuses on public 
space and discusses the role of public prayer and prayer processions. We will 
then conclude with some final remarks. 
3 ‘Us and Them’: Shaping the Public Discourse of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church
Homosexuality was decriminalized in Serbia in 1994 and Orthodoxy —  having 
arguably suffered a form of persecution under Communism — has experi-
enced a revival during the ethnically motivated wars in ex-Yugoslavia in the 
1990s. It was not before the fall of Milošević’s regime in October 2000, however, 
that both the Church (seen by many as the keeper of traditional authentically 
Serbian values) and the LGBT activist community (seen by many as the harbin-
ger of the so-called “Western” values of individual freedoms and human rights) 
felt it possible to begin contending for public space. Interestingly enough, vari-
ous debates surrounding both of these public presences have questioned their 
right to public space, as both (homo)sexuality and religion have historically (at 
best) been relegated to the private domain. Both communities historically oth-
ered by the state and society can now arguably be seen othering each other — 
the Church inordinately more so. 
The struggle over public representation of religion and homosexuality 
became very visible in the year 2001, which ironically enough was a landmark 
year in Serbia both for the Serbian Orthodox Church and LGBT communi-
ties, whose histories have since been inextricable. In 2001, religious education 
was incorporated into the public school system for the first time after World 
War II. This development opened up space for the Church to enter the public 
institutions, and thus, according to Drezgić, “marked a transition from ‘instru-
mental pious nationalism’ to ‘religious nationalism’ in Serbia” (Drezgić 2015, 1). 
Religious education was instituted as a facultative subject. The alternative 
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subject, entitled “civil education”, was envisaged as its secular counterpart. 
In terms of values and morality it was usually attributed to European civic 
democracies and as such associated in the public mind with joining the EU. 
Religious education (“veronauka”) was thus from the start juxtaposed to this 
“Euroscience” (“evronauka”) (Baćević 2005). It is also in 2001 that the first Pride 
Parade was attempted in Belgrade. However, the slogan “There is Room for 
Everyone” under which it was organized proved tragically unbecoming when it 
was violently attacked by right-wing groups and football hooligans, and many 
of its participants were badly beaten.
The Serbian Church, as has been noted, “consistently constructs homosexu-
als as ‘constitutive outside’ and/or ‘external enemies’ of the nation — as the 
nation’s Other” (Van den Berg et al. 2014, 129). As the Church discourse has of 
late in effect been shaped in opposition to the discourse of human rights and 
democratic freedoms, associated with the accession to the EU — having itself 
been othered by international leftist discourse during Communism — it now 
lays claim to ‘traditional Serbian values’ which it interprets as the centering 
of all that is patriarchal and ethnic. Consequently, the public discourse of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church focuses on ethnicity (as many Serbs as possible con-
trolling as much territory as possible), proper gender roles (which evidently 
advance the previous goal), and exclusion of the Other (anyone who would 
impede the previous two goals) — all hallmarks of religious nationalism 
(Sremac & Ganzevoort 2015; Drezgić 2015). This discourse of religious national-
ism, accentuating these three points, is readily observable in the vast majority 
of the Church’s positions — as reported in the media — on issues of general 
public interest such as Kosovo, abortion, and Gay Pride Parades. 
What is less readily observable is ‘purely’ religious discourse. Drezgić notes 
that the Church’s position on abortion presents abortion as mostly a demo-
graphic problem (of declining birth rates), rather than a theological issue 
related to, for instance, the sanctity of life (Drezgić 2015). This preference for 
secular rather than religious argumentation is applicable to other parts of 
the public discourse of the Church as well, especially that devoted to Pride 
Parades. Less focused on ethical, doctrinal, and spiritual facets of abortions 
and practiced homosexual relations within Christian theology, Church pub-
lications on these issues are instead stressing the imagined instrumental 
effect of recalcitrant women and homosexuals on birth rates. The dominant 
theme of these statements appears to be the importance of increasing the 
number of ethnic Serbs and thus strengthening the Serbian nation state. Not 
surprisingly, the ideology of pro-natalism in particular serves to connect the 
Church discourse of Pride Parades to the discourse on abortion, often explic-
itly. Metropolitan Amfilohije’s notorious statement issued before the sub-
sequently banned 2009 Pride parade makes an explicit connection between 
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abortion and homosexuality as unnatural refusals to “bring forth good fruit” — 
in this particular interpretation of Matthew 3:9, apparently taken to refer lit-
erally to procreation (Amfilohije 2009). In 2013, Patriarch Irinej, asked about 
his position on the impending (and later banned) Pride Parade, said for the 
daily Politika that “[n]othing is as endangered in these tragic times we live in 
as marriage and the family. Both marriage and the family are being destroyed 
intentionally, especially by way of the gay parade”. The Patriarch added that 
the last thing the Serbian people would need to finally disappear off the face 
of the earth would be for this “plague” to befall us and that something should 
be done instead to counter the falling birth rates (Politika 2013). The official 
site of the Belgrade Cathedral has an entire subsection dedicated to the abor-
tion issue, which squarely blames the demographic situation in Serbia on col-
lapsing traditional gender roles, which apparently include the emancipation of 
women and “homosexualism” [sic].5
Church statements on demographic and ethnic issues, in particular when 
related to LGBT issues, can be read as an attempt to directly intervene in state 
affairs. For instance: prompted by Dveri, a right-wing movement with Church 
ties which had by then already transformed into a registered political party 
(itself a sign of the times), Patriarch Irinej requested that the government ban 
not only the Pride Parade, but also the Swedish photographer Elisabeth Ohlson 
Wallin’s Ecce Homo exhibition (Irinej 2012). The exhibition, which shows Jesus 
Christ among LGBT people and according to certain interpretations also as 
himself gay, was at that time held within the four walls of the Belgrade Center 
for Cultural Decontamination. Prime Minister Dačić supported the Patriarch’s 
position and expressed dismay at the fact that it is indeed not an official crime 
in Serbia to offend the religious beliefs of the dominant group (Blic 4.10.2012).6 
In return, those opposing conservative Church statements have attempted to 
counter such interference with politics and governance, often from a human 
rights perspective. Much public attention has been paid to Amfilohije’s 2009 
statement, mentioned above, which by some was understood as a violent 
threat. In this instance, the Ombudsman for gender equality issued the rec-
ommendation that the Metropolitan apologize to the LGBT community. The 
recommendation was not accepted by the Metropolitan and the struggles 
over public statements and Pride events seem to have set a precedent for the 
Church’s incursion into state affairs, which has culminated in its interference 
with the 2014 Gay Pride, our case study to which we will now turn.
5  Anti-gay discourse in Serbia tends to use the word “homosexualism” to refer to what is 
perceived as an ideological movement constantly striving to recruit new adherents.
6   See Valić-Nedeljković, Ganzevoort and Sremac (forthcoming). 
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4 Part One — Public Discourse of the Church
With regard to the Pride Parade and LGBT issues, the official print media of the 
Church have largely responded with a sonorous silence (Jovanović, 2013) — in 
stark contrast with previous years. When dignitaries of the Church did decide 
to offer opinions, “traditional”/Biblical depictions of homosexuality (sulphu-
rous pits, fire and brimstone, Sodom and Gomorrah, being hewn and cast into 
the fire) were noticeably far less pronounced in their discourse than they had 
been before. This caused some analysts in the media to declare that the Church 
has moderated its position (Blic 26.9.2014). As has been noted here, however, 
traditional imagery still belonged to religious discourse, whereas novel inter-
ference with those not belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church became 
apparent in disturbing ways, especially in May and September.
In May, disastrous floods devastated Serbia, causing loss of lives and exten-
sive material damages. It was during this difficult time for a large portion of 
Serbia’s citizens that they were informed that the catastrophe had been caused 
by their approval of Conchita Wurst or their acceptance of the Pride Parade. 
Metropolitan Amfilohije stated that the “woman with the beard” Conchita 
Wurst, recent winner of the Eurovision Song Contest in her feminine per-
formance persona, was being “affirmed like Jesus” in these parts and that 
the floods were God’s way of returning us to the path of righteousness (Blic 
19.5.2014). Patriarch Irinej, on the other hand, blamed the floods on the Pride 
Parade — originally planned for May and deferred on account of the floods — 
which wickedly propagated “dignity and democracy, and all against God and 
the laws of life” (Blic 15.5.2014).
Just as it seemed that the tensions had subsided and that the Church would 
venture no public opinions with regard to the Pride Parade, the Patriarch per-
sonally signed a statement on it in September. The public opinion was awake 
with the shocking parallel it featured between homosexuality, on the one 
hand, and pedophilia and incest on the other, but perhaps a more striking 
development was that the Patriarch assumed a position of secular authority. 
A prominent portion of the statement consisted of a definitive and authorita-
tive assertion that those taxpaying citizens of Serbia who also happened to be 
LGBT activists organizing the Parade had no right to burden the “entire state 
apparatus” and cause the state significant material expenses in order to secure 
their safety from violence: “one thing is certain: you have the right to parade, 
but only at your own expense and the expense of those giving you orders7 [. . .] 
not at the expense of Serbia” (Irinej 2014). 
7  This is probably meant to refer to the EU or the US — the outside Other instructing and com-
manding the Other within.
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In his article entitled “The False Narrative of Pride”, published in Sabornik, 
bulletin of the Belgrade Cathedral on the day of the Parade, deacon Nenad 
Ilić contends that the “Pride” Parade is a calculated attack on national pride, 
and that the rainbow flag, symbolizing the LGBT community worldwide, is 
problematic mostly because it “defies” nations (Ilić 2014). The sermon held on 
the day of the Pride parade at the Belgrade Cathedral by a priest who had not 
been allowed to pass through a police cordon securing the parade included 
the lament that “even Albanians and KFOR”8 in Kosovo were known to show 
respect to Serbian Orthodox priests, whereas we were now living under a state 
of occupation — in the middle of Serbia.9 
In the light of church interference with the Pride Parade, what was the 
discourse of LGBT activists on the Church? Banners carried by participants 
in the Parade (Blic 28.9.2014) — featuring pictures of Patriarch Irinej and 
Metropolitan Amfilohije alongside popular song lyrics which implied, in con-
text, their (latent) homosexuality or desirability to males — could demon-
strate that the battle for public space has been taken up by the “other side” as 
well.10 This was the first time that LGBT activists had mentioned the Church 
or its dignitaries. Admittedly, the media accentuated this rift. In other footage, 
available on YouTube, Adam Puškar, one of the organizers of the Parade, can 
be seen attempting to dissuade the young participants from using the banners, 
after which an unidentified person is seen breaking them. Boban Stojanović, 
activist and organizer of the Parade, repeatedly refused to comment on the 
Patriarch’s statement, claiming he was “too small” to reply to the head of the 
Church. The LGBT movement in Serbia seems reluctant to directly address 
the Church, and even if it does, it is done only by a small minority or even 
merely in individual cases.
Secularists — both theists and non-theists — have long embraced Jesus’ 
admonishment to “[r]ender therefore unto Caesar the things which be 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s. (Luke 20:25) It is customarily 
interpreted as advice to leave matters of the state to the state without rebelling 
unnecessarily against secular governments, while simultaneously not forget-
ting one’s religious duties to God. The increasingly secular discourse  observable 
in the statements made by Church dignitaries in 2014 can be interpreted as 
8     The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led international peace-
keeping force which has operated in Kosovo since the territory came under NATO control. 
Both NATO and KFOR carry strong negative resonances for many Serbs.
9     Source: observation made during personal presence at said Liturgy at said church.
10    Valerie Sperling (2015, 2) in her book Sex, Politics, & Putin shows how pro-and anti-regime 
activists in Russia used similar concepts of feminity, masculinity, and homophobia as 
strategies for political legitimacy and propagandistic performativity. 
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refusing to render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s, perhaps marking 
the beginning of an ongoing process of increasing church interference with 
state policy on LGBT rights.
5 Part Two — Claiming the Public Space
Public discourse of the Church does not only encompass the words of its dig-
nitaries, but also their actions, when these are performed in the public eye. 
The year 2014 introduced a novel strategy into the discourse of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church with regard to both public issues of import to religio-sexual 
nationalism: abortion and the Pride Parade. This strategy could be termed 
‘political public prayer’ and included in 2014 two instances of politically moti-
vated prayer processions performed in the public space.11
The first and less widely reported of the two was organized to demand a 
legal ban on abortion. On April 7, after the Liturgy commemorating the feast 
of Annunciation, starting from the Belgrade Cathedral, the prayer procession 
made its way to the Parliament, where a prayer was said and banners were 
held. Organized by 1389, a nationalistic right-wing group, it was only tacitly 
supported by the clergy. When it was repeated in 2015, it was with a “condi-
tional blessing” from the Patriarch this time (the condition being that no vio-
lence should take place). Apparently striving to become an annual event, this 
prayer procession is receiving increasing support from within the Church.
The second politically motivated prayer procession to take place in 
2014 — more immediately relevant to our topic and of more interest to the 
mainstream media — was organized on September 28, only hours after the 
successful Gay Pride Parade had ended and in direct protest that it had been 
allowed. Organized by Dveri, as mentioned a nationalistic right-wing politi-
cal party, it was promoted as an “all-national procession celebrating the sanc-
tity of life, marriage and birth” and received open support from the clergy. 
Commencing in St. Sava’s Temple, the prayer procession followed the route 
that the Pride Parade had passed. In order to ‘purge’ the city of the Parade, the 
participating priests reportedly used censers throughout the route. That the 
streets of Belgrade needed to be “cleansed” of homosexuality becomes even 
more  evident when we look at the way in which the concept of “parade” was 
11    The precedent for political public prayer was set in May 2013 when, after the Brussels 
Agreement was signed by Serbian officials, a demonstration was organized to protest 
what was seen as a betrayal of Serbian interests in Kosovo. Metropolitan Amfilohije saw 
fit at this protest to perform a public prayer for the dead — for the Government of Serbia.
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present in the media in the period of the Pride Parade. Apart from the prayer 
procession a grandiose military parade was announced in honor of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. Both the procession organized by the state and the 
military parade came to dominate the use of the word “parade” in the media in 
this period. It seemed as though Church and state were cooperating in quickly 
re-marking the streets as religious, heterosexual and masculine. For this paper, 
we will focus on the discursive effects of prayer processions.
Though they are obviously an incursion of the Church into matters of the 
state, the question that must first be asked is: are these prayer processions even 
sacral to begin with — or secular? Protesting existing legal liberties of the sec-
ular state (the constitutional right to gather freely in public space and the legal 
right to abortion), demanding that they be revoked and invoking the power of 
the state to instead discipline and punish the unruly behavior of LGBT indi-
viduals and women, it could be said that these ‘prayer processions’ are in effect 
disguised demonstrations, merely invested with the aura of a holy rite.
To understand fully the meaning that this new strategy holds within the 
discourse of religio-sexual nationalism that the Church is seen employing, it 
might be helpful to examine the traditional symbolism of prayer processions 
in Serbia. This symbolism, as Todorović notes, is a result of the merging of two 
historical layers of meaning:
1. In Christian (and specifically in the Eastern Orthodox Church) symbol-
ism, the procession is seen as coming from within the holy space of the 
church and then ritually reordering nature and the entire Cosmos. An 
important aspect of it is its community-building function — this is a rite 
that is customary for even otherwise non-churchgoers to attend. 
2. In pre-Christian symbolism, however, it was the holy places outside — 
such as cemeteries and sanctified oak trees — that were visited during 
the procession. The community-building function was even more pro-
nounced in pre-Christian times, as these processions were to be attended 
by all members of the village community (or at the very least a represen-
tative of each household) and sometimes the processions formed the 
occasion for decision-making (Todorović 2006). Since many Serbs iden-
tify strongly with pre-Christian rituals and beliefs, and these are very 
present especially in rural areas, it will be useful to include insights into 
the content and politics of pre-Christian symbolism in our analysis.
Approaching contemporary politicized prayer processions from a Christian 
perspective, one could argue that the Church is merely reordering the world in 
its own image of sacredness — but the incongruence between the accustomed 
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ritual symbolism of the processions and the present political demands is 
immediately striking. A parallel with the ritual practice of the Eucharist might 
be useful to illustrate the symbolic disparity that has in effect transpired here. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church believes in the ‘Real Presence’ and each Liturgy 
gathers the faithful who partake of the Eucharist. Communion also serves 
to unite the members of the Church into its body — the community of the 
 faithful — who may intellectually disagree on certain issues of theology and 
politics, but are united in this communal rite. Moreover, this ritual practice in 
no way affects non-believers, who are free to interpret it quite  differently — 
which they do. Taking part in the Eucharist, then, is not considered as a politi-
cal act in the sense that participation would be considered as a sign of the 
participant’s undivided support for all Church teachings. Community, not 
dogma, is central. In contrast with that, politicized prayer processions are 
much more politically charged and therefore disrupt both the community of 
the faithful and the lives of non-believers. Since taking part in prayer proces-
sions is considered as a display of personal agreement to the political ends of 
the procession, the faithful must self-exclude from the rite if they disagree with 
its political intent. For non-believers there is much less space for theological 
or political disagreement: they are not free to ignore the decidedly non-sym-
bolic demands for legal changes. In prayer processions, then, theology, poli-
tics and community have become more intertwined than in the celebration of 
the Eucharist, and both participating in them as well as refraining from them 
is much more charged and regarded as a display of political (dis)agreement. 
Prayer processions do not accommodate the theological diversity that might 
be observed among those participating in the Eucharist. Communal prayers 
used for political ends also mark a boundary between opinions of individu-
als exerting a political influence of the Church as a hierarchical institution, 
on the one hand, and the political use of the ritual praxis of the Church as 
the community of the faithful, on the other. This new line crossed in 2014 is 
perhaps visible only to Church members, some of whom can no longer in good 
conscience attend all her services. In those cases where the Church service 
includes a prayer procession, members are requested to consciously make a 
decision on whether or not they agree with the political goals of the proces-
sion. These members are thus in effect unintentionally excommunicated along 
with the intentionally excommunicated Other in opposition to whom the pro-
cession is organized.
If, however, we approach the processions from a pre-Christian vantage 
point, we might accede that some interesting parallels exist. Pre-Christian 
processions were, as Todorović noted, often also an occasion for the commu-
nity to make important decisions. However, these included the entire local 
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community, whereas the present processions make a point of excluding mem-
bers whose behavior they seek to regulate, ignoring their potential contribu-
tion to the community. Moreover, while contemporary processions find their 
accumulation in praying before the Parliament, some forms of pre-Christian 
processions ritually included kneeling before sanctified oak trees. One could 
argue that while traditional processions moved to outside spaces they deemed 
sacred, contemporary processions could be interpreted as possibly worship-
ping or sanctifying secular institutions such as the state, the nation, or pub-
lic space itself. One might be thankful, at least, that these prayer processions 
endorsed by the Church did not end in the contemporary variant of worship-
ing trees, which would probably have been genuflecting before the Parliament 
building. 
Ironically, the parallels between the Church and LGBT communities men-
tioned above are continued in this vying for public space via Pride Parades and 
prayer processions. As has been noted, both homosexual citizens and mem-
bers of the Serbian Orthodox Church have been historically persecuted; both 
the religious belief as well as (homo)sexual activity has at some point been 
directed to the private sphere. Church processions were, ironically, banned 
during Communism “for security reasons” (Todorović 2007) — the same rea-
sons cited so often for the banning of Pride Parades. Jokes about Pride Parades 
as “gay processions” offer an illuminating illustration to some of the issues 
surrounding this battle for public space. Pride Parades have been likened to 
Ascension Day prayer processions traditionally held in Belgrade, as both rep-
resent an annually held walk through the city center in colorful robes — and 
accompanied by prominent politicians (Gay Serbia forum 2010).
Both the Church and LGBT activists appealed in 2014 to the power of the 
state and claimed the right to public space — but only the Serbian Orthodox 
Church strove to actively deny it to the other. Both could possibly justifiably be 
accused of capitulating to the state, though actual accusations have only been 
leveled at gay activists by other members of the LGBT community so far, as few 
within the Church would appear to desire that it remain aloof from the state.
The rift between the Church and LGBT communities — but also, symboli-
cally, between what is perceived as ‘traditional’ Serbian and ‘liberal’ Western 
values — was arguably exacerbated by the 2014 battle for public space headed 
by the Church. The prayer processions in particular demonstrate an imagined 
community of the ‘pure’ in terms of religious nationalism. Defined by intention-
ally excluding the unruly Other (in legal and social, not only religious terms), 
this community is ironically predicated on excommunication. Exclusion as the 
defining trait of religio-sexual nationalism is thus paradoxically illustrated by 
the use of communal prayers. Focusing on ethnicity, proper gender roles, and 
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exclusion, the public discourse of the Church on the topic of gender minor-
ity issues in 2014 thus continues to be consistent with that of religio-sexual 
nationalism (Sremac & Ganzevoort, 2015).
One noticeable change in the Church’s discourse on gender minority issues 
in 2014 is the increasing incursion of the sacral into the secular by way of two 
complementary strategies:
1. Stating secular aims and using a more secular (or at least monistic) 
discourse;
2. Using ritual prayers for political ends.
The politically motivated prayer processions are an especially egregious 
boundary transgression for secularists within the Church. It is one thing, argu-
ably, to refuse to render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s — by ver-
bally opposing certain liberties the secular state has given her citizens — and 
entirely another matter — by using communal Church prayers for political 
purposes — to in effect render unto Caesar the things which be God’s.
Another change noticeable in the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
over the course of time is consistent with the change perceived in the dis-
course of Serbian nationalism itself (Drezgić 2015; Veličković 2012): diminished 
explicit focus on ethnicity and increased focus on reconstructing ‘traditional’ 
gender roles. The Other itself changes — from the outside enemy of another 
ethnicity to the enemy within, the unruly ‘them’ preventing ‘us’ from being a 
great nation by refusing to perform their proper role in procreation and family 
life. Patriarchal gender roles which are seen as maximizing birth rates remain 
a consistent part of the Church discourse throughout recent history — placing 
it firmly within the framework of religio-sexual nationalism.
6 Conclusion
When compared to previous years, in the year 2014 the Serbian Orthodox 
Church seemed to attempt to push back the frontiers between the religious and 
the secular when issues of sexuality and gender are concerned. First, because 
the Church increasingly interfered not only with state policy (abortion) but 
also with popular culture (Conchita Wurst). Second, because its rhetoric itself 
became less theological and more secular, though traditional Orthodox imag-
ery still forms an important part of the discourse. Moreover, it expanded its 
attempts to influence the Serbian public opinion on homosexuality not only 
by issuing public statements in written media, but also by organizing church 
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rituals (prayer processions) which physically claimed the streets of Belgrade 
for religion, heterosexuality, procreation and national identity. Our close read-
ing of church discourse and strategy indicates that religio-sexual nationalism 
is a multi-layered phenomenon which takes place not only in spoken or writ-
ten language, but also in rituals, symbols and images. Both levels, moreover, 
mutually reinforce one another: public prayer processions become a powerful 
ritual precisely because they are connected to a political message on sexuality 
and gender.
There are several discursive effects to be noted in the aftermath of the 
Church’s campaign against Gay Pride in 2014. The first is that the “secular 
move” of the Serbian Orthodox Church probably addresses a wider audience 
than a strong theological discourse. In 2009, 16 % of the Serbs indicated that 
they visited a church service at least once a month, while a much larger pro-
portion (35%) only attends at major church festivals (Naletova 2009, 387). One 
might wonder if a population whose regular religious activities such as church 
attendance are relatively low will agree with or even understand explicit theo-
logical or Biblical references. A move to secular argumentation will therefore 
more successfully connect to ‘common knowledge’ rather than (absent) reli-
gious knowledge. Second, a strong focus on popular culture firmly locates 
homosexuality outside the church. Opposed to one official church statement 
which addresses homosexuality directly and relatively mildly are various 
statements which contain clear condemnations of homosexuality, but these 
statements do not consider lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders within the 
church: they address public expressions of homosexuality, rendering homo-
sexuality a social problem rather than (for instance) a pastoral issue or church 
political challenge. The firm action against the public display of homosexual-
ity seems to release the Church of its responsibility to address the issues of 
LGBT-members. Third, by introducing ideologically charged rituals such as 
the prayer procession directly after the Pride parade, the Church increasingly 
makes an appeal to citizens to endorse a political religion in which the “right” 
attitude to sexuality, gender and national identity becomes a prerequisite for 
religious participation. These public rituals (in Serbia very popular) reduce the 
space for an individual, more liberal stance on sexuality and gender, a “lib-
erty of conscience” that hitherto was granted to participants of the Eucharist. 
Church members, moreover, are not only asked to agree with church teachings 
on an intellectual level, but (by partaking in prayer procession) to use their 
bodies as a physical affirmation thereof. 
The strong connection of religious participation, nationalist discourse and 
a conservative stance on sexuality and gender in Serbian Orthodox rhetoric 
might be one of the explanatory factors of the reluctance of LGBT-activists 
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to openly or directly criticize the church. Such a strong opposition, of course, 
would soon be removed from a discussion on theology or social acceptance 
and be directed toward issues of national identity and religious and national 
belonging. In order to be able to lay a claim on part of the public opinion and 
some of the public space, LGBT-activists cannot afford to have their national 
loyalty questioned — and in Serbia, it has hopefully become clear, this loyalty 
is strongly connected to citizens’ attitude to Orthodoxy. 
At the same time, the Church’s strong opposition and strategic move to 
secular discourse and claims to the public space may be read as an affirma-
tion of the success of the LGBT-movement. If the Church found it necessary to 
“purge” the street with a prayer procession after the Pride Parade, it must have 
felt that something “real” had in fact happened to those streets. It is precisely 
the cleverly organized religious opposition, then, which emphasizes the suc-
cess of queering the streets of Belgrade in 2014. 
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